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Apple, Inc. v. Superior Court: Caveat Emptor:
The Future of Online Credit Card Transactions
James John Shield, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet profoundly affects modern business transactions. The
emergence of the Internet marketplace1 presents lucrative opportuni-
ties for businesses and consumers alike. Since businesses have access
to a larger potential market, an online seller can receive greater econ-
omies of scale, access previously unavailable buyers, and increase the
size and scope of its operations, which thereby increases profits and
commercial success. Likewise, consumers also receive the benefits of
greater competition, which results in lower prices, an increased availa-
bility of previously unattainable products, and a wider variety of com-
parable goods. However, the law pertaining to e-commerce did not
develop as rapidly as the Internet market. As such, the boom in e-
commerce grew in tandem with the development and prevalence of
instances of Internet fraud.2
The laws governing e-commerce were developed in response to the
surge in Internet crime; however, the laws only applied retroactively
after the theft occurred. 3 But in February of 2013, the California Su-
preme Court issued the unprecedented case of Apple v. Superior
Court.4 The court diverged from the body of law protecting consum-
ers from Inteinet fraud in favor of new standards that preference pro-
tecting sellers at the consumers' expense. 5 In short, the court held
that California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (the "Act"), 6
which prevented sellers from requiring or requesting personal infor-
* J.D. Candidate 2015, DePaul University College of Law; B.S. 2012, University of Illinois -
Champaign-Urbana.
1. Throughout the comment, "Internet market", "Internet sales", "online sales", and "online
transactions" all refer to the transactions occurring on the Internet and are used
interchangeably.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.A.1.
4. Apple v. Superior Court, 292 P.3d 883 (Cal. 2013).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747 (1971).
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mation from consumers during a credit card sale, did not apply to
credit card transactions that occurred on the Internet. 7
This Note will explore the potential legal and policy issues ad-
dressed by the Apple court. Part II presents the background informa-
tion necessary to fully understand the impact of the Apple decision.
Section A discusses the general nature of online transactions, high-
lighting the growth of e-commerce and credit card fraud and the po-
tential risks confronting both consumers and sellers in an online
transaction. Section B details the relevant statutory provisions the
Apple court interpreted and the pertinent decisions preceding Apple.
Part III covers the actual subject matter of the Apple decision,
presenting the facts, procedural history, the majority's holding and
reasoning, and the dissent's objections. Part IV analyzes arguments
on both sides of the court and attempts to justify the holding due to
the policies of caveat emptor, Section A, and judicial discretion, Sec-
tion B. Finally, Part V contemplates the potential impact that Apple
will have on e-commerce and Internet fraud. Specifically, Section A
explains how consumers are subjected to increased risks of credit card
fraud and identity theft, and Section B discusses potential issues that
might arise from having separate bodies of law governing traditional
and online sales.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the pertinent history of online commerce and
the policy decisions impacting consumer protection. The first section
analyzes the general nature of online transactions, focusing on the
rapid expansion of the Internet market and the fraud that inevitably
accompanied its growth, the reasons consumers are more vulnerable
to fraud on the Internet,8 and the measures online-sellers can take
protect themselves from fraud.9 The second section examines the
body of law preceding the Apple decision, analyzing both statutory10
and case law.1 '
7. Apple, 292 P.3d at 883.
8. See infra Part II.A.1.
9. See infra Part II.A.2.
10. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
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A. The Nature of Online Transactions and Internet Fraud
E-commerce rapidly started to expand in the early-2000s in tandem
with consumer deception and fraud. 12 In 2000, "online retails were
$8.686 billion, an increase of 67.1% from the Fourth Quarter of
1999.,,13 Within just one year, e-commerce sales reached $25.8 billion:
a 297% increase.14 The online market's exponential pattern of growth
persisted through the decade and became an integral part of the U.S.
economy.15 The most recent e-commerce statistics indicate that on-
line sales were a highly lucrative market: U.S. manufactures reported
$2.7 trillion sales, 49.3% of all shipments; merchant wholesalers repot-
ted e-commerce sales of $1.6 trillion, 24.3% of all sales; services indus-
tries captured $346 billion, 3% of total revenues; and retailers
reported $194 billion, 4.7% of total sales. 16 In just over ten years, e-
commerce grew from $8.686 billion annually, 17 to $4.84 trillion annu-
ally,18 a 55721.85% increase. However, the boom in e-commerce cre-
ated fertile grounds for criminals to exploit consumers and commit
credit card fraud and identity theft.19
New forms of consumer fraud inherently develop simultaneously
with technological advancements because "fraud operators are always
among the first to appreciate the potential of a new technology to
exploit and deceive consumers. '20 In 1997, less than one thousand
Internet fraud complaints were filed with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") yearly; however, the number of annual complaints in-
creased to over 25,000 just three years later in 2000.21 In 2012, the
annual reported consumer complaints were 289,874 with an estimated
dollar loss of $524,441,110, an 8.3% increase from 2011.22 Consumer
12. See On-Line Fraud and Crime: Are Consumers Safe?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade & Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th
Cong. 26-27 (May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Eileen Harrington, Assoc. Dir.
of Mktg. Practices, Bureau of Competition, FTC).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See 2011 E-stats, U.S. CENsUs BUREAU 1 (May 23, 2013), available at http://
www.census.gov/econ/estats/2011reportfinal.pdf.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Hearing, supra note 12, at 26-27.
18. Total from figures in 2011 E-stats, supra note 15, at 1-2.
19. See Hearing, supra note 12, at 26-27.
20. Id. at 26. The FTC recapped the problems surrounding technology innovation, fraud, and
commerce. "Long-distance telemarketing attracted con artists when it was introduced in the
1970's. They swarmed to pay-per-call technology when it became available in the late 1980's.
Internet technology is the latest draw for opportunity predators who specialize in fraud." Id.
21. Id.
22. 2012 Internet Crime Report, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 4 (2012), available at
http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2012_IC3Report.pdf.
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fraud has thrived on the Internet for a variety of reasons, which
presents the FTC and other government agencies with
a host of novel challenges.. . to combat fraud and deception online.
Traditional scams - such as pyramid schemes and false product
claims - thrive on the Internet. Moreover, the architecture of the
Internet itself has given rise to new high-tech scams that were not
possible before development of the Internet. Both traditional
scams and more innovative ones exploit the global reach and instan-
taneous speed of the Internet. In addition, the Internet enables con
artists to cloak themselves in anonymity, which makes it necessary
for law enforcement authorities to act much more quickly to proac-
tively detect emerging deceptive schemes before the perpetrators
disappear. 23 And because the Internet transcends national bounda-
ries, law enforcement authorities must be more creative and cooper-
ative to successfully combat online fraud.2 4
Thus, as Internet fraud becomes more high-tech and the size and
scope of the fraud expands with the increasing global market, the ef-
fective remedies for detecting the fraud must adapt just as quickly;
however, consumer safeguards presently lack the ability to act proac-
tively - as opposed to retroactively - to detect and combat Internet
fraud.25 While fraud occurring on the Internet and in a traditional
"brick and mortar" business share similar characteristics, the Internet
adds a dimension of complexity and risk that warrants more proactive
consumer protection.26
1. Consumer Vulnerability to Internet Credit Card
and Identity Theft
Credit card fraud, which "is the use of another person's credit card
or credit card information for the purpose of stealing," exceeded $3.2
billion in 2007.27 Similarly related to credit card theft is identity theft
- "the use by a thief, unbeknownst to his victim, of the victim's name,
social security number or other personal identifying information, to
open accounts and rack up huge debts for goods and service. ' 28 Con-
sumers face an increased risk of both credit card fraud and identity
theft on the Internet because online purchases require consumers to
23. Id.
24. Hearing, supra note 12, at 26-27.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id. at 5-6.
27. Lydia Segal, Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective on Tackling an Intransigent Problem,
16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 743, 747 (2011) (citing Reed Richardson, Are You Compliant,
Small Business Online Community, BANK OF AM. (Apr. 17, 2008, 8:41 AM), https://smallbusiness
onlinecommunity.bankofamerica.com/community/managing-your-finances/merchant-services/
blog/2008/04/17/are-you-compliant).
28. Hearing, supra note 12, at 24.
2015] THE FUTURE OF ONLINE CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS 533
produce their credit card number and personal information to an un-
known source with the hope this information will not be reproduced,
copied, or stolen. Since online purchasers do not have "an opportu-
nity to meet and see online merchants in person, consumers are right-
fully concerned with security and fraud potential when purchasing
merchandise over the Internet. '29
Frequently, online sellers do not provide consumers adequate
means to contact them; some sellers omit telephone numbers and of-
fice locations and choose only to give consumers email addresses. 30
Even when the seller offers a telephone number and address, consum-
ers never physically see the location and, therefore, cannot be certain
that the seller is who they claim to be.31 Because online transactions
involve an inherent risk that the seller is not who it claims to be, con-
sumer protection legislation has historically protected consumers. 32
Accordingly, legislatures generally determine that
[l]aws should not place the risk of fraud or error losses from online
transactions on consumers, but on the providers and online
merchants who profit from the use of the technology ... [because]
shift[ing] the risk of fraud on consumers create[s] a moral hazard
and will produce economically inefficient outcomes. 33
Congress consistently recognizes the inherent problems with online
identity theft and credit card fraud, but its legislation targets the crimi-
nal activity after the fact, rather than providing proactive measures to
protect consumers.34 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
("CFAA") created civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized access
to financial institutions' or the federal governments' digital data.35
The Cyber-Security Enhancement Act of 2002 ("CSEA") 36 criminal-
ized computer hacking and strengthened the CFAA's penalties. 37 The
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 ("ITADA")
imposed criminal sanctions for identity theft and required the FTC to
29. Watchara Neitivanich, Mechanisms for the Protection of Online Consumers; A Compara-
tive Analysis of the U.S. E-Sign Act and Thai E-Transactions Act, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 103, 103 (2004); see generally, e.g., Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Oppor-
tunities for Criminals and Dilemmas for Investigators, 76-Feb N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (2004) (detailing
the general nature of Internet fraud and its impact on both consumers and businesses).
30. Neitivanich, supra note 29, at 103.
31. Id.
32. The Role of Certification Authorities in Consumer Transactions, INTERNET LAW AND
POL'Y FORUM (Apr. 14, 1997), http:// www.ilpf.org/groups/ca/exec.htm.
33. Neitivanch, supra note 28, at 108.
34. Segal, supra note 27, at 752-53.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2005).
36. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2156 (2002).
37. Id. § 225(g).
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establish a method to record consumers' complaints. 38 Congress also
"passed several laws to protect consumers from unauthorized credit
card charges and losses tied to identity theft."39 The "Truth in Lend-
ing Act,40 ("TILA"), Regulation Z,41 and the Fair Credit and Billing
Act 42 ("FCBA") limit consumer liability for unauthorized charges.. ."
and the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008
("ITERA") allows victims of credit card fraud and identity theft to
"seek restitution for money spent restoring their credit and fixing
other associated harms."'43 While both federal and state legislatures
addressed the problems of Internet fraud, the laws were ineffective in
protecting consumers since the fraud must occur before the consumers
can seek relief under these laws. Consumers are at risk every time
they use their credit card online, more so than ever, because Internet
credit card fraud and identity theft are increasing every year and the
current law fails to afford proactive means of protection.
2. Seller's Susceptibility to Fraudulent Transactions
Online transactions are a "double-edged sword" for both buyers
and sellers. Because neither party to the transaction can readably
identify the other, both are at risk of fraudulent misrepresentation. 44
If a seller suspects fraud in a traditional "brick and mortar" business it
can request a valid form of identification (driver's license or state
identification card) to verify the consumer's identity. But, the inher-
ent nature of Internet transactions completely eliminated the personal
component of a traditional sale. Thus, when a consumer's credit card
information is stolen and used to purchase goods from a seller, both
parties suffer. Accordingly, sellers identified the growing instances of
credit card fraud 45 and sought measures to protect themselves from
fraudulent transactions.
One of the most common policies sellers implement to address the
issue of Internet credit card fraud are verification systems that ascer-
tain the identity of the purchaser. For example, there is a patented
method available that can obtain "credit card information relating to
the transaction from the consumer, and .. . [verify] the credit card
based upon a variety of parameters .. .[that] are weighted so as to
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2005).
39. Segal, supra note 27, at 753-54.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2014).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
43. Segal, supra note 27, at 752.
44. For example, both parties can assert a false identity.
45. See supra Part I.A.
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provide a merchant with a quantifiable indication whether the credit
card transaction is fraudulent. ,46 After the customer purchases an on-
line product the merchant sends the credit card information to a third-
party verifier, who checks the history and consistency of the credit
card user's purchases. 47 These systems provide sellers with a reliable
and discrete method to verify the purchaser's identity. First, the credit
card user's purchase history can be ascertained though previous credit
card purchases and then a consistency check determines if the present
sale conforms to the consumer's purchase history.48 Next, the
purchase information is imputed into an automated verification sys-
tem that determines whether or not the information given during the
sale 49 matches the information on the card. 50 Finally, the system veri-
fies whether the credit card user's Internet address matches the In-
ternet Protocol ("IP") address of the consumer's previous purchases. 51
Thus, online sellers presently possess unobtrusive and effective means
that can determine and ensure a consumer's identity, thereby protect-
ing them from potential fraud.
Due to the nature of the online transaction, and the accompanying
potential for fraud, sellers were the first to move to prevent credit
card fraud/identity theft. This is because online sellers possess the
means to protect themselves from fraudulent transactions. Sellers
have access to verification systems that proactively detect fraud,
whereas consumers, who lack access to these systems, must entirely
trust online sellers with their credit card and personal information.
46. U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154 (filed July 28, 1997). The abstract of the Patent provides a
method and system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between consumer
and a merchant over the Internet. The method and system comprises obtaining credit
card information relating to the transaction from the consumer; and verifying the credit
card information based upon a variety of parameters. The variety of parameters are
weighted so as to provide a merchant with a quantifiable indication of whether the
credit card transaction is fraudulent. In so doing, an integrated verification system is
provided which allows a merchant, or the like, to accurately and efficiently determine
the validity of a transaction over the Internet.
Id.
47. Id. at col. 2 1. 25.
48. Id. at col. 2 1. 66 & col. 3 1. 1.
49. Specifically, information that is essential to the purchase, such as delivery address.
50. See U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154 col. 3.
51. Id. at col. 3 1. 14.
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B. Legal Realm Prior to Apple
1. Statutory Law
The California legislature enacted the Song-Beverly Credit Card
Act of 1971 to govern the issuance and use of credit cards.52 The leg-
islature modeled the Act on Federal TILA; with the purpose of ex-
tending consumer protection from credit card fraud on the state
level. 53 The Act prohibits the recording of personal identification in-
formation as a request, or requirement, in a credit card transaction.54
Personal identification information "means information concerning
the cardholder, other than information set forth on the credit card,
and including, but not limited to, the cardholder's address and tele-
phone number. '55 The Act explicitly provides exceptions 56 to transac-
tions that involve contractual obligations, it permits pay-at-the-pump
gas stations to require the ZIP code linked to the card, 57 and enumer-
ates when the seller is required to record the credit card information
under federal or state law.58 Personal information may also be re-
corded if it is incidental to complete the individual transaction, such as
52. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747 (1971).
53. See id. § 1747.01.
54. Section 1747.08(a) provides:
[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (c) no person, firm, partnership, association, or cor-
poration that accepts credit cards for the transaction of business shall do any of the
following . . .(2) [r]equest, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as
payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to provide personal
identification information, which the person, firm, partnership, association, or corpora-
tion accepting the credit card writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon
the credit card transaction form or otherwise.
Id. § 1747.08(a) (1971) (effective Oct. 9, 2011).
55. Id. § 1747.08(b).
56. While section 1747.08(c) provides three subsections of exceptions, only section
1747.08(c)(3) is relevant for this note. Subsection (c)(1) applies when "the credit card is being
used as a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or other similar occur-
rences." Id. § 1747.08(c)(1). The subsection (c)(2) exception relates to "cash advance transac-
tion." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747.08(c)(2).
57. The Apple court found section (c)(3)(B) to be the most significant exception that pre-
cluded extending the Act to online transactions because it was added with the 2011 Amendment.
See Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, 292 P.3d 883, 893 (Cal. 2013).
58. See § 1747.08(c)(3). In pertinent part, section 1747.08(c)(3) provides that the Song-Bev-
erly Act does not apply if any the following applies:
(A) The person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card
is contractually obliged to provide personal identification information in order to com-
plete the credit card transaction. (B) The person, firm, partnership, association, or cor-
poration accepting the credit card in a sales transaction at a retail motor fuel dispenser
or retail motor fuel payment island automated cashier uses the ZIP code information
solely for prevention of fraud, theft, or identity theft. (C) The person, firm, partner-
ship, association, or corporation accepting the credit card is obligated to collect and
record the personal identification information by federal or state law or regulation.
2015] THE FUTURE OF ONLINE CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS 537
when the information is necessary to deliver, service, or install the
purchased goods and services.5 9
The final exception in subsection (d), which created the issue in Ap-
ple, permits a seller to require consumers "to provide reasonable
forms of positive identification, which may include a driver's license or
a California State identification, or ... another form of photo identifi-
cation, provided that none of the information contained thereon is
written or recorded on the credit card transaction form or other-
wise."'60 Finally, the Act provides civil and criminal penalties for vio-
lators.61 In short, the Act protects consumers by prohibiting sellers
from requesting or requiring personal information from consumers in
the course of a credit card transaction that could be used for fraud and
identity theft.
The expansion of the e-commerce market has forever changed the
credit card transaction and transformed the implications of the Song-
Beverly Act. Since the Act was originally legislated in 1971, and was
never specifically amended to include e-commerce credit card transac-
tions, the Apple court needed to determine whether or not the Act's
protections extended to online sales.
2. Case Law
Technological advancements lead to unforeseen circumstances and,
therefore, legislation enacted prior to these advancements places a
burden on the courts to determine whether or not the legislature in-
tended a specific law to apply to in general to all situations, or only
those comprehended at the time when the law was enacted. The
Song-Beverly Act's plain language is unambiguous when considering
traditional "brick and mortar" transactions; however, the e-commerce
explosion has presents the courts with more difficult situations to
interpret.
59. See id. § 1747.08(c)(4).
60. Id. § 1747.08(d). The full text of this subsections provides that the Song-Beverly Act
does not prohibit any person firm, partnership, association, or corporation from requir-
ing the cardholder, as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in
part for goods or services, to provide reasonable forms of positive identification, which
may include a driver's license or a California state identification card, or where one of
these is not available, another form of photo identification, provided that none of the
information contained thereon is written or recorded on the credit card transaction
form or otherwise. If the cardholder pays for the transaction with a credit card number
and does not make the credit card available upon request to verify the number, the
cardholder's driver's license number or identification card number may be recorded on
the credit card transaction or otherwise.
Id.
61. See id. § 1747.08(e)-(f).
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Florez et al. v. Linens 'N Things, Inc. was the first case to analyze
the Act in light of the e-commerce boom.62 The Florez court held the
seller violated section 1747.08 because it requested the consumer's
telephone number before completing the credit card purchase. 63 The
court found a telephone number is personal information under the
Song-Beverly Act and, since the seller "requested" it to complete the
online credit card sale, the Song-Beverly Act prohibited the practice. 64
In Archer v. United Rentals, Inc., the Second Appellate District held
that the legislative purpose of the Song-Beverly Act is to protect "the
personal privacy of an individual in his or her personal identification
information during a transaction involving the credit card issued for
consumer purposes. ' 65 The court reasoned that section 1747.08 ap-
plies to all consumer credit purposes without regard to the actual pur-
pose for which the credit card was used.66 Therefore, the court did
not draw a distinction between "brick-and-mortar" credit card trans-
actions and Internet sales even though the e-commerce existed in
2003.
The Central District Court of California re-affirmed Archer in Roth-
man v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., by stating that "a violation [of section
1747.08(a)] only occurs if the personal information is written down or
recorded in some way."' 67 Hence, the court essentially decided that a
credit card transaction was a credit card transaction for the purposes
of the Song-Beverly Act irrespective of the sale's form. The implica-
tion of this holding is the Act applies regardless of form: the Act pro-
tects consumers regardless of the structure of the sale.68
Then, in Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., the California Su-
preme Court held that requesting or requiring a ZIP code constitutes
personal identification information within the meaning of section
1747.08 and a retailer cannot request said information.69 Specifically,
the court found that the legislature intended for the word "address" to
62. 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
63. Id. at 470-71.
64. See id.
65. 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
66. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). It is important to emphasize that here that just two years
before the Apple decision the court held that the Song-Beverly Act applied to all credit card
transactions irrespective of the sale's form.
67. No. CV 11-03617 SJO (RZx), 2011 WL 6940490, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011).
68. By stating the Song-Beverly Act applies to all consumer transactions, regardless of its
form, explicitly means the structure of the sale is irrelevant to the statute's application. E-com-
merce is the form of a credit card transaction and, therefore, it would seems that the Song-
Beverly Act should afford consumers its protection during online transactions.
69. 246 P.3d 612, 620 (Cal. 2011).
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be construed as not only a complete address, but rather any compo-
nents of a consumer's address.70
Following the court's decision in Pineda, the Fourth Appellate Dis-
trict decided in Alveraez v. Brookstone Co, Inc. that Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 1747.08, in Pineda, is not "limited in any way
based on how (or whether) a retailer subsequently uses ZIP code in-
formation requested from a credit card customer and then recorded
during a transaction."'7 1 "Section 1747.08 generally prohibits busi-
nesses from requesting 'personal identification information' during
credit card transactions and then recording that information. 7 2
Hence, the aforementioned courts determined that the Song-Beverly
protections apply to both Internet credit card sales and "brick-and-
mortar" transactions. The Apple court subsequently diverged from
this precedent and laid an unprecedented decision.
III. SUBJECT OPINION
In Apple, Plaintiff attempted to purchase downloadable material
from Apple Inc.'s ("Apple") Internet store that only sold download-
able products.73 Plaintiff claimed Defendant "requested or required
him to provide his address and telephone number as a condition of
accepting his credit card as payment" for the download purchase on
iTunes.74 Plaintiff sued Apple on behalf of himself and a putative
class of similarly situated individuals.7 5 Plaintiff alleged Apple vio-
lated the Song-Beverly Act by recording each customer's personal in-
formation even though Apple was not contractually or legally
obligated to collect a customer's telephone number or address to com-
plete credit card transaction and Apple did not require a customer's
telephone number or address for any special purpose incidental, but
related, to the individual credit card transaction. 76 In the alternative,
Plaintiff asserted that even if the billing address was necessary to vali-
date the downloadable content transaction, there was no need for re-
quiring Plaintiff's phone number because it was not necessary for
Apple to have this information to complete the transaction.77
70. Id. Furthermore, the court held that its statutory interpretation could apply retrospec-
tively and afford the Plaintiff relief. Id.
71. 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 777, 783 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
72. Id. at 781.
73. Apple Inc. v. Super. Ct., 292 P.3d 883, 885 (Cal. 2013).
74. Id. at 884.
75. Id. at 885.
76. Id. at 890. The downloadable content was instantaneously transferred to the consumer,
which means that there was no purpose for an address for shipping or delivery purposes.
77. Id.
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At trial, Apple moved to dismiss these complaints by filing a de-
murrer, but the trial court denied it because the Song-Beverly Act "is
silent on exempting online credit card transactions" and does not
completely exempt online credit card transactions for the Act's
reach.78 However, Apple promptly filed a writ of mandate seeking
review of the order, but the California Court of Appeals summarily
denied.79 The California Supreme Court decided to hear Apple's case
for the purposes of determining whether section 1747.08 is violated
when an online retailer requests and records a consumer's home ad-
dress, phone number, and email address as a condition to accepting a
credit card as payment for a downloadable product.8 0
A. The Majority
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court decided that online re-
tailers were permitted to require a customer's home address and
phone number as a condition to accepting a credit card as payment for
electronically downloadable products because the California legisla-
ture could not foresee the Internet market and, therefore, did not in-
tend for section 1747.08 to govern Internet transactions.81 Because
downloadable content did not exist and was not anticipated when the
statute was enacted, the court reasoned that the legislature did not
intend to apply the Song-Beverly Act in situations where a "standard
mechanism"82 of verification was not possible. 3 Since photographic
identification was unavailable during an online transaction, there was
no privacy intrusion in requiring personal information because sellers
were entitled to protect themselves from potential credit card fraud.84
Furthermore, the court decided that since the California legisla-
ture's 2011 amendment to the Song-Beverly Act permitted "pay-at-
the-pump" gas stations to require the consumer's ZIP code as a condi-
tion of the purchase because "no employee or other seller is present"
during the sale 5 that Internet sales, where no employee is physically
present during the transaction, permits the seller to require more in-
trusive personal information. 6 However, the court neglected to ad-
dress whether or not sellers may use a consumer's IP address and
78. Apple, 292 P.3d at 885.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 884.
81. Id. at 889.
82. E.g., physical verification of a photo I.D.
83. Apple, 292 P.3d at 888-889.
84. Id. at 889.
85. Id. at 890.
86. Id. at 892.
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credit card history to verify the purchaser's identity rather than more
intrusive means.
Additionally, the court held that the California Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 2003 ("COPPA") indicated that the legislature knew
how to make its e-commerce policy explicit.87 As such, since it ne-
glected to address online transaction directly, the legislature did not
want the Song-Beverly Act to apply to online transactions and, thus,
narrowly restricted the language to preclude an application to Internet
transactions.88 Said in another way, because the legislature did not
address online credit card transactions, the court determined the legis-
lature did not want the Song-Beverly Act to apply to online sales.8 9
The court found COPPA permitted online transactions to "go above
and beyond the requirements of Section 1747.08," and, therefore, con-
cluded that the Song-Beverly Act only applied to traditional "brick
and mortar" sales, not online transactions. 90 Since retailers must
"conspicuously post" third-party disclosure privacy policies regarding
the personal identity information they collect and disclose, the court
found the privacy intrusion irrelevant because a consumer could de-
cline to accept the policy. 91 Hence, the court reasoned that an online
seller was permitted to require personal information since a con-
sumer, if "not satisfied with the policy of a particular retailer," can
decline to purchase a product from the seller.92 Therefore, an online
seller is permitted to require personal information from buyers in an
e-commerce transaction.
Based on
section 1747.08's text, purpose, and history [the court was] unable to
find the clarity of legislative intent or consistency with the statutory
scheme necessary to conclude that the Legislature in 1990 intended
to bring the enormous yet unforeseen advent of online commerce
involving electronically downloadable products - and the novel
challenges for privacy protect and fraud prevention that such com-
merce presents - within the coverage of the Credit Card Act.93
However, the majority casted doubt on its own decision by stating
"the Legislature may wish to revisit the issue of consumer privacy and
fraud prevention in online credit card transactions, ' 94 indicating the
87. Id. at 894.
88. Apple, 292 P.3d at 894.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 895.
92. Id.
93. Apple, 292 P.3d at 896.
94. Id. at 896.
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court believed the protections of the Song-Beverly Act probably
should apply to online transaction.
Ironically, after refusing to grant consumers online protection from
credit card fraud, the court casted no doubt on the claim that "protect-
ing consumer privacy in online transactions is an important policy
goal, nor [did it] suggest that combating fraud is as important or more
important than protecting privacy. [The court] express[ed] no view on
this significant issue of public policy. ' 95 Hence, the court illusorily
claimed to be exercising judicial restraint by not dictating public pol-
icy. Yet, the court's holding explicitly created the policy that consum-
ers have no privacy protection from online sellers extracting personal,
and private, information. Because "[t]here [was] no doubt that retail
commerce [had] changed dramatically since section 1747.08 was en-
acted ... the idea of computerized transaction involving the sale and
purchase of virtual products was beyond any legislator's imagination"
the court refused to extend the Song-Beverly protections to online
sales. 96 However, the dissent adamantly opposed the majority's deci-
sion for a variety of reasons.
B. The Dissent
Justice Kennard dissented because "California statutory law prohib-
its retail sellers from recording the personal identification informa-
tion, such as home addresses and telephone numbers, of their credit-
card-using consumers" because the legislature wanted to protect con-
sumer privacy. 97 Because "[t]he statue does not exempt online sales of
downloadable products... and on its face the statute applies to sales
conducted over the Internet just as it does to sales conducted face-to-
face or by mail or telephone," Justice Kennard concluded the Song-
Beverly Act should apply to online transactions.98 Justice Kennard
believed the majority's holding "leav[es] Internet retailers free to de-
mand personal identification information from their credit-card-using
customers and to resell that information to others." 99 Hence, contrary
to the purpose of the Song-Beverly Act to protect consumers from
fraud and identity theft, "[t]he majority's decision [was] a major win
for [online] sellers, but a major loss for consumers, who in their online
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 896 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 896-97 (emphasis added).
99. Apple, 292 P.3d at 897 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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activities already face an ever-increasing encroachment upon their
privacy." 00
Justice Kennard argued that the "statute means just what it says and
contains no exemption, expressed or implied, for online sales of
downloadable products." 01 Thus, courts should presume "that the
plain language of the statue express[ed] congressional intent [and,
thus,] is rebutted only in 'rare and exception circumstances.'" 0 2 Be-
cause the statue applies to any "person, firm, partnership, association,
or corporation that accepts credit cards for the transaction of busi-
ness,"'1 3 this statute applies to Apple because it fulfills these criteria
and therefore Apple should abide by the Song-Beverly Act.10 4 The
statute "prohibits sellers from recording ... credit-card-using custom-
ers' 'personal identification information"' and applies to any seller
that accepts credit cards for to complete the transaction. 05 Therefore,
Apple fulfills the statutory requirement by being a corporation that
accepts credit card as a form of payment and, accordingly, cannot re-
quire personal information to complete the transaction.
Justice Kennard also analogized the impersonal nature of mail and
telephone transactions, both non-face-to-face transactions that are
protected by the Song-Beverly Act, to online transactions. 10 6 Since
the Song-Beverly Act applied to mail and telephone transactions that
involved no visual confirmation of the buyer's identity, Justice Ken-
nard felt there was no significant difference between a purchase con-
ducted over the Internet and one conducted via mail or telephone. 10 7
In all situations, the credit card is not physically presented to the
seller. 10 8 Therefore, Justice Kennard felt the Song-Beverly Act ap-
plied equally to online and "brick-and-mortar business"
transactions. 109
Furthermore, the court recently held that the legislatures "overrid-
ing" purpose in enacting the Song-Beverly Act's prohibition against a
seller's recording of credit-card-using customer's personal information
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
432, n.12 (1986); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
103. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1747.08(a) (1971).
104. Apple, 292 P.3d at 897 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 898.
107. See id. at 890.
108. Id.
109. Apple, 292 P.3d at 902 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
544 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:529
was to protect the consumer right to privacy.' 10 Hence, "the major-
ity's focus on fraud protection for sellers is at odds with this court's
recent" decisions, and overlooks "the fact the Legislature already did
enact addition protections" to prevent credit card fraud.111 Therefore,
the majority erroneously provided businesses protection at the direct
expense of consumer privacy, which was the focus of the Song-Beverly
Act.112
Justice Baxter also dissented because he believed that the majority
decision "reli[ed] on speculation and debatable factual assumptions
[that] carved out an expansive exception to section 1747.08 that leaves
online retailers free to collect and use the personal identification in-
formation of credit card users as they wish. 1113 The statute expressly
permits a seller to require positive forms of identification, but prohib-
its requiring personal information to complete the transaction.1 14 The
statute explicitly states that "personal identification information" is
"information concerning the cardholder, other than information set
forth on the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the card-
holder's address and telephone number." 115  Therefore, the statute
unequivocally prohibits sellers from recording an address and tele-
phone number as a requirement of a credit card transaction. 116 Hence,
Justice Baxter felt the majority, as a matter of law, erroneously ap-
plied the Song-Beverly Act to advocate online sellers from the undue
risk of credit fraud because the purpose of the statute was to protect
consumers.117
IV. ANALYSIS
This part seeks to objectively dissect the Apple court's holding and
shed light on the specific legal issues raised in its decision. The first
section reconciles the court's rule by applying the principle of caveat
emptor, and the second section explains why the court's holding was
incorrectly decided because the court restrained from applying a stat-
ute where the face and legislative intent of the Act was unclear; how-
ever, by deferring to apply the statute, the court essentially dictated
public policy.
110. Id. at 899 (referring to Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 619 (Cal.
2011)).
111. Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 900.
113. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting).
114. Apple, 292 P.3d at 900 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 901 (citing § 1747.08(b)).
116. Id. at 902.
117. Id. at 904.
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A. Revival of Caveat Emptor
The Apple majority's reasoning is justified on the grounds of caveat
emptor. 118 Online sales inherently present problems for both consum-
ers and sellers: the question inevitably asks who should bear the risk?
In Apple, the court decided consumers should bear the risk of online
credit card fraud and identity theft, which was an unexpected develop-
ment. 119 The decisions leading up to Apple all alluded that the court
believed the Song-Beverly Act applies to online transactions. In
Archer, which was decided in 2011, the court found the purpose of the
Song-Beverly Act was to protect consumers in any credit card transac-
tion in any form.120 Thus, the previous interpretations of the Act indi-
cated it protected consumers in all credit card transactions by making
it illegal for sellers to record personal information. Accordingly, the
Apple decision was completely divergent from the previous decisions
that favored consumer protection.
The court justified its "buyer beware" position by drawing a distinc-
tion between traditional face-to-face sales and online transactions. 21
In the former, the California legislature permitted seller's to reference
a California driver's license or state identification card to verify iden-
tity.1 22 In the latter, however, sellers lack means to confirm that the
credit card user is, in fact, the actual purchaser. Accordingly, the
court reasoned online sellers are permitted to request and require per-
sonal information, such as street address, phone number and email
address, to confirm the purchaser's identity. 123 As a result, consumers
must divulge highly sensitive personal information to online sellers
and hope this information is not stolen.
The court believed its decision was a sound method to prevent
fraud and that there was "no tension between privacy protection and
fraud prevention."'1 24 However, the court created a broad exception
to protecting consumers from fraud and narrowed online privacy
rights, thereby implicitly declaring preventing online sellers from
fraud is a more important goal than consumer protection and the right
to privacy. So, who must bear the risk of online identity theft and
fraud? Apple unequivocally answered the legal question by allocating
118. "A doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their own risk." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
102. (4th Pocket ed. 2011).
119. Apple, 292 P.3d at 899.
120. See generally Archer v. United Rentals, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
121. Apple, 292 P.3d at 892-93.
122. Id. at 891. It is important to note that this form of identification was only used to verify a
purchaser's identity - it could not be recorded by the seller.
123. Id. at 894.
124. Id. at 889.
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the burden on consumers, so long as the California's legislators do not
say otherwise.
B. Disguised Judicial Activism
The Apple opinion - at first glance - is justified on the grounds of
judicial restraint. It claims that because the California legislature did
not foresee the expansion of e-commerce when the Song-Beverly Act
was enacted, the court should not go so far as to apply it to unforesee-
able developments. 125 The legislature had the opportunity to specifi-
cally address whether the Act should apply to the Internet
transactions, and, since it declined to do so, the court held that the
Act's protections were not intended to apply to online credit card
sales.' 26
The potential issue with this justification is the fact that the court
gives more weight to the absence of legislative intent than the plain
meaning of the statute. The Song-Beverly Act, on its face, unequivo-
cally bars sellers from "requesting, or requiring as a condition to ac-
cepting the credit card as payment .. .for goods or services, the
cardholder to write any personal identification information upon the
credit card transaction form or otherwise.' 27 The legislature pro-
vided explicit exceptions to statute and "e-commerce" is not listed. 128
Hence, the plain meaning of the statute would support the position
that the Act applied to all credit card transitions. However, the court
ruled that online transactions are exempt from the protections of the
Act because the Legislature did not specifically address the issue. By
making this ruling, the court established a policy that could not be
ascertained from the statute itself. The Apple court's decision essen-
tially creates policy by stating there Song Beverly Act's protections do
not apply to e-commerce transactions.
The Apple dissents present valid counter arguments that the major-
ity fails to address.'29 The majority places great importance on the
fact that the legislature could not foresee e-commerce and, therefore,
the Song-Beverly Act only applies to face-to-face transactions. How-
ever, the court held in Archer the Act applies to all credit card trans-
actions including telephone and mail order credit card transactions,
125. Id.
126. Apple, 292 P.3d at 895.
127. CAL Civ. CODE § 1747.08(a)(1).
128. Id. § 1747.08(c)(1)-(4).
129. See supra Part III.B.
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which are also non-face-to-face transactions. 130 The dissenters refused
to join the majority because precedent clearly indicated that the Act
would most likely cover online transactions.131 Accordingly, it is pos-
sible to conceive that the legislature did not make a specific e-com-
merce amendment to the Song-Beverly Act because prior to the
Apple decision an amendment was not necessary: the Archer court
ruled the Act applied to all credit card transactions, including non-
face-to-face ones occurring in a typical "brick-and-mortar" store.
However, the court decided to ignore the Act's purpose, consumer
protection, 132 and implemented a judicially created policy that is detri-
mental to consumers.
V. IMPACT
This part contemplates the potential impact the Apple decision will
have on the public. The first section explains the increased amount of
risk consumers must now bear and the second analyzes the impact the
decision might have in the legal world by demanding a separate and
specific body of law for online transactions.
A. Consumers Face Increased Risk of Identity Theft &
Internet Fraud
Apple imposed a strict standard of caveat emptor on consumers
who purchase products online with credit cards. In effect, consumers
must provide online sellers with whatever personal information the
seller requests and/or requires - i.e. address, phone number, email ad-
dress - to continue with the online transaction. Thus, consumers face
increased risk of being subject to credit card fraud and identity theft
because they are required to provide all sellers with the necessary per-
sonal information needed to steal someone's identity.
The situation imposes three potential risks on consumers: (1) higher
instances of fraudulent transactions, (2) the increased chance of hav-
130. See Archer v. United Rentals, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Ap-
ple, 292 P.3d at 900 (citing Archer, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 132). The dissent finds not only that this
point very persuasive, but it is also a huge point that the majority failed to address. In both mail
order and telephone order sales, the seller and purchaser never come into physical contact with
one another. In these instances, the seller has no means to verify the buyer's identify via a State
issued identification card. Hence, the dissent found these situations analogous to online
purchases because, just like in mail and telephone sails, there is no means for the seller to verify
the purchaser's identity. Accordingly, the dissent could not rationalize why the Song-Beverly
Act would apply to some credit card transactions where the purchaser's identity cannot be read-
ily verified, but not to e-commerce sales.
131. See Apple, 292 P.3d at 897-98.
132. Id.
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ing a credit card and personal information stolen on the Internet, and
(3) decreased incentives for sellers to proactively prevent credit card
fraud. The combined effect of subjecting consumers to these risks is a
decrease in consumers' confidence in the purchasing online products,
which could result in fewer online sales. Rather than strict caveat
emptor for online sales, a better policy would be to increase con-
sumer's desire to purchase online by increasing their confidence in the
market.
The Apple decision opens the door for online scams to exploit con-
sumers by allowing fraudulent sellers to acquire the consumer's credit
card and personal information. Because consumers cannot verify with
whom they are dealing, they bear the burden of transacting with a
fraudulent seller who could steal the individual consumer's credit card
and identity. With this information, the thief can fraudulently use the
consumers' credit card and information. Even more problematically,
the Apple court specifically stated its holding applies to downloadable
content where there is no physical delivery of the product.133 Hence,
the sale is transmitted to a computer address that can be easily
changed by a thief using a public computer and storing the informa-
tion on a flash drive. Permitting a seller to demand as a condition of
the sale all of the requisite information to steal a credit card and iden-
tity, therefore, imposes a heightened risk of consumers dealing with
parties that can abuse this personal information.
The Apple decision also increases the risk that third parties steal
consumers' credit card number and identity. Internet thieves develop
in tandem with policy of the Internet market.134 Accordingly, cyber-
criminals have a greater opportunity to intercept consumers' credit
card and personal information. While a variety of businesses use
methods such as a "secured checkout" to prevent such from occurring,
there is nothing to prevent a hacker from devising a method to infil-
trate the secured checkout and steal the consumers' credit card num-
ber and identity. One of the biggest issues not even addressed in the
opinion is the fact that under the Song-Beverly Act, "brick and mor-
tar" stores were permitted to require a valid form of identification as a
condition to sale, but the seller could not record the personal informa-
tion contained thereon. History has already proven that consumers
are a high risk for credit card and identity theft because businesses
often store the purchasers' credit card number and personal informa-
tion in a database. For example, in December of 2013, Target Corpo-
133. Apple Inc. v. Super. Ct., 292 P.3d 883, 896 (Cal. 2013).
134. See supra Part II.A.
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rate's ("Target Corp.") systems were infiltrated and all of the
information contained on consumers' credit cards was stolen. 135 How-
ever, in January 2014, Target Corp. discovered in addition to credit
card information being stolen that the consumers' personal informa-
tion including street address, telephone number, and email address
were intercepted as well.136 Neiman Marcus has also reported similar
credit card thefts.137 Therefore, not only are consumers at risk every
time they use their credit card online, but also when they are not using
their card, if the online seller records the card and personal informa-
tion and it is hacked.
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that credit card companies
have little incentive to implement fraud detection technologies. 138
Specifically, credit card companies have little incentive to combat
identity theft and fraud because "[t]hey get paid every time their card
is used, even in a fraudulent transaction."'139 The credit card compa-
nies get paid an "assessment fee" - "a percentage of the price of every
purchase made using their card brand" - 0.0925% for Visa and
0.0950% for MasterCard and Discover.140 Counter intuitively, the
credit card industry itself is presently profiting from the increases in
credit card fraud and, therefore, will unlikely implement more ad-
vanced fraud detection technologies that would benefit consumers.
Furthermore, the credit card companies themselves are not liable for
any of the loss: the seller is the one who "takes the hit when the thief
makes the purchase over the phone, Internet, or by mail, known as
135. Anne D'Innocenzio, Target Breach Appears to Be Part of a Broader Scam, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/target-breach-appears-be-part-broader-scam.
136. Id. In fact, I purchased a product on Target Corp.'s website in October of 2013 and
received the following email from Target Corp: "As you may have heard or read, Target learned
in mid-December that criminals forced their way into our systems and took guest information,
including debit and credit card data. Late last week, as part of our ongoing investigation, we
learned that additional information, including name, mailing address, phone number or email
address, was also taken. I am writing to make you aware that your name, mailing address, phone
number or email address may have been taken during the intrusion." Email from Target.com to
James John Shield, Jr. (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:02 AM).
137. D'Innocenzio, supra note 135.
138. See Segal, supra note 27, at 751 ("Technology Plays a central role in data security, but as
criminal tactics continually evolve, it is important that the incentives first change to encourage
the industry to select the best technological solutions for itself on a continuing basis. Right now,
although a plethora of technological innovations exist, the banks and card companies appear
more interested in not 'rocking the boat' than in pushing for the best options for all parties.");
see, e.g., Ian Heller, How the Internet has Expanded the Threat of Financial Identity Theft, and
What Congress Can Do to Fix the Problem, 17 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 84, 106-08 (2007) (argu-
ing that using biometrics is an alternative to combat identity theft).
139. Segal, supra note 27, at 770.
140. Id.
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'card-not-present' transactions." 141 Because the sellers absorb the
cost of fraud, they require more detailed and more personal informa-
tion from the purchasers to protect themselves from fraud. The prob-
lem with this arrangement is the fact that consumers are forced to give
up a plethora of information on the Internet, which can readily be
stolen by hackers. Therefore, consumers are the ultimate losers under
the system affirmed by Apple.
The question Apple inevitably poses is who should bear the risk of
future online credit card fraud. Because online sellers require con-
sumers to divulge sensitive personal information as a condition to ac-
cepting payment, consumers bear the risk of this information being
intercepted and reproduced in future transactions. The retroactive
and proactive dichotomy of "bearing the risk" is not a new problem in
the realm of consumer protection. 142 If the consumers have to bear
the risk of fraud and are not guaranteed protection when conducting
in e-commerce, then, most likely, the consumers will be wary to con-
duct in Internet sales. 143 Here lies the bone of contention in the Apple
decision - consumers drive the economy, not businesses. If consumers
are not purchasing the goods that are offered for sale, then the buyer
is not selling, and the economy is suffers. Consumers should be af-
forded more protection while using the Internet and not subject to the
risk of loss when their credit card and/or identity is stolen and then
used. Consumer confidence in a market is essential to the market's
success and, therefore, the laws should promote - or be interpreted to
encourage - consumer confidence in e-commerce. The more consum-
ers feel confortable in making purchases the more buyers and sellers
benefit; it is a win-win for both parties to the transaction. The Apple
decision, while a sound decision as a matter of law, ignored this policy
aspect 144 and decided caveat emptor applies to e-commerce, leaving
consumers to bear the risk of future fraud at the expense of protecting
sellers.
141. Id.
142. For a discussion about the retroactive problems of current consumer protection laws and
a proposition for a more proactive approach to preventing consumer fraud before it occurs, see
David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45 (2007).
143. Kristen Weisse, Comment, Remedies for Internet Fraud: Consumers Need All the Help
They Can Get, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 205, 218-221 (2002).
144. It is important to note that prior to Apple the California courts had applied the Song-
Beverly Act to non-face-to-face transactions, such as through the mail or over the telephone.
Apple Inc. v. Super. Ct., 292 P.3d 883, 889-900 (Cal. 2013). As a matter of law, the California
Supreme Court was justified in extending the Act's protection because the Legislature did not
explicitly convey its intent; however, as a matter of policy and economics, it is fair to argue the
court should have afforded consumers more protection, not subject them increased chances of
future fraud.
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As a matter of public policy, this situation presents a lose-lose for
consumers and sellers alike: consumers are forced to bear the risk,
which will - potentially - discourage them from utilizing e-commerce,
and sellers will sell less, resulting in lower profits. In order to improve
the economy, it would be beneficial for consumers to be afforded
more protection to boost their confidence in the market. The increase
in confidence will lead to more purchases, which will help both sellers
and the economy. As online theft becomes more prevalent and
thieves become more sophisticated in their methods for obtaining in-
formation to commit credit card and/or identity theft, the Apple
court's rule clearly opens the door for increased instances of credit
card fraud and identity theft. Consumers bear all the risk of purchas-
ing online and such a policy will discourage consumer confidence in
the online market, instead of stimulating it by protecting consumers
from fraud. A far better policy is to make security standards for credit
card companies mandatory and have them absorb more liability from
fraudulent transactions. 145
B. Legal Implications of Distinguishing Online and
Traditional Sales
The Apple dissents point out the potential problems with the major-
ity: a commerce related law does not apply to e-commerce unless this
is what the legislature explicitly states. 146 It points out that nowhere
in California's Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") does it state that
it applies to the transaction of goods on the Internet. 147 Thus, based
on the majority's own logic, the Code does not apply to online trans-
actions. The impact of such a solution is frightening: every state
would need to enact two different bodies of law - one pertaining to
traditional sales and another for online transactions. This solution is
clearly undesirable for a variety of reasons. Requiring the legislature
to specifically amend every law that applies to traditional credit sales
to specifically state that the statutes apply to online sales or enacting
online credit card laws that differ from the traditional ones will de-
crease consumer confidence in the market place and negatively impact
their purchasing decisions, not to mention the enormous undertaking
145. Credit Card Fraud advocates a method that is molded after the European Union where a
public authority oversees the development of security rules. The Article provides that making
mandatory security standards, appointing a Data Security Commissioner, establishing incentives
for credit card companies to increase, establishing a system of penalties for companies that act in
bad faith, and reducing the ability to shift fraud losses downstream would be an advantageous
solution to the presently flawed system. See Segal, supra note 27, at 778-81.
146. Apple, 292 P.3d at 889-900.
147. Id.
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such an overhaul would demand. While consumers will bear the ini-
tial harm of this policy, the online sellers will be the ultimate losers.
Because consumers will be less confident in purchasing online prod-
ucts there is the possibility that the consumer will forgo the purchase.
Thus, sellers would be missing the opportunity for a potential sale and
their revenue would likely suffer. In the aggregate, this loss of eco-
nomic output will harm consumers and sellers. Therefore, it is a lose-
lose for both.
Having two separate bodies of laws governing online and traditional
sales will only result in confusion that would discourage consumer
confidence in the market. It is counter intuitive to have one set of
rules apply when a consumer walks into a store to buy a good, but a
different set when the same consumer purchases the same good on-
line. Because the Code does not specifically apply to the sale of on-
line goods, does Apple mean the California legislature must amend
California Commercial Code and specifically declare it applies to e-
commerce? - In all practical sense, no. While this is an extreme side
of the spectrum, it helps illustrate the potential issue of requiring two
distinct bodies of laws governing sales.
Furthermore, if the laws differ, then the difference could impact
purchasing decisions. For example, one of the major benefits of on-
line sales is convenience; however, if that market becomes subject to
more stringent laws that make it a less desirable mode of purchasing
goods online, then it is possible that consumers will forego purchasing
the goods it intended on purchasing online altogether. The transac-
tion costs of having to physically go into a store might cause the con-
sumer to forego the sale altogether, thereby decreasing the producers
sales and the economy at large. On the flip side of the coin, if online
transactions are loosely regulated and consumers face ever increasing
chances of fraud, then consumers may purchase less on the Internet,
which thereby decreases the seller's profits and, in the aggregate, eco-
nomic productivity of as a whole. 148 The problem requires a balance
the costs of fraud between both consumers and sellers; placing the
burden on one party will only hurt the economy and, therefore, be
detrimental to both.
Consumer protection laws and policies generally seek to protect
buyers from fraud in the first instance; however, e-commerce has
opened "Pandora's Box" and has only been able try and remedy the
fraud after it occurs. 149 Cyber law is no longer in its infancy and its
148. For a discussion of Internet regulations and consumer protection, see Weisse, supra note
143, at 216-223.
149. Friedman, supra note 142, at 46-51
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needs to be streamlined with the body of consumer protection law
governing traditional sales. 150 Consumers drive the economy and
need to be confident in the security of the Internet market. Different
protections applying to traditional and Internet sales will result in con-
sumer confusion, as opposed to consumer confidence. The Apple de-
cision impairs consumer confidence by essentially declaring that
consumers must post any and all private information on the Internet if
a seller desires it.151 This is a punctuated departure from the present
state of law that distinguishes traditional and Internet sales. While it
is only possible to speculate on the potential issues that will result
from different rules regarding online and traditional sales, it is simply
good policy that the same rules apply to the purchase of the same
good, no matter the forum.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet presented and continues to present obstacles that were
unforeseeable when countless statutes were enacted. While it is un-
derstandable that special rules should govern the new form of technol-
ogy that presents unprecedented issues, it is a slippery slope to require
an entirely different set of commercial rules to govern e-commerce.
Consumer protection against credit card fraud and identity theft oc-
curring on the Internet should be treated legally analogous - if not the
same - to those that occur in the course of a traditional sale. If a
statute clearly states that a seller cannot require, request, and record
consumers' personal information, then it should not matter whether
the sale is in person or online, regardless of whether the legislature
could have foreseen e-commerce. After all, the legislative intent
clearly wanted to do one thing - protect consumers from fraud. Fur-
thermore, if a law's purpose is to protect consumers from credit card
fraud then that is exactly what it should do: it should not subject con-
sumers to an increased chance that credit card fraud and identity theft
might occur in the future. Instead, it should promote consumer confi-
dence and stimulate the economy.
The Apple court implemented a policy that diverges from plain
meaning of the Song-Beverly Act and the implicit legislative intent. It
150. Fedorek, supra note 29, at 10 (explaining the evolution of Cybercrime).
151. The implication of the Apple decision is profoundly far more reaching than the court
meant it to be. Based on dicta, the Song-Beverly Act's protections do not apply in any way
whatsoever. Therefore, it is potentially fair game for an online seller to require a social security
number as a condition to the sale. While this may protect the seller from fraud, it comes at the
expense of the consumer being required to produce said private information and bear the risk of
it being intercepted/stolen and fraudulently used.
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will be interesting to see how the California courts fill in the questions
that Apple court left unanswered and how other jurisdictions react.
One can only hope that the trend does not catch on and an entirely
separate body of law must be specifically legislated. Until then, caveat
emptor.


